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BOYS MARKETS IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT:
JUDICIAL SYMPATHY FOR SYMPATHY STRIKES
CHARLES E. MuPHY*

In three decisions this year the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
attempted to come to grips with an increasingly widespread labor problememployee work stoppages in response to labor disputes involving unrelated or
separate groups of employees. The term sympathy strike is used to describe
employees ceasing their own work out of respect or sympathy for someone
else's labor dispute. The question of whether or not such work stoppages
are permissible notwithstanding no-strike commitments made between labor
organizations and employers, and more particularly whether such strikes may
be enjoined by federal courts pending binding arbitration, has produced
conflicting decisions in the Seventh Circuit and a deep split among the
federal courts in this country.
In 1974, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Inland Steel Co. v.
Local 1545, UMW' upheld the issuance of an injunction prohibiting employee sympathy strikes in violation of a no-strike commitment in an applicable collective bargaining agreement. In two 1975 decisions, Gary Hobart
Water Corp. v. NLRB 2 and Hyster Co. v. Independent Towing and Lifting
Machine Association,3 the court, contrary to its conclusion in Inland, ruled
that federal courts could not enjoin sympathy strikes. In a third case this
year, Western Publishing Co., Inc. v. Local 254, Graphic Arts Union4 the
court concluded that an injunction could be issued against an employee strike
over work alleged to be "struck work" in the circumstances present in that
case. The rationales employed by the court in reaching these contradictory
results in very similar factual situations has generated confusion and concern
among labor, management and employees in this critical area.
THE BACKGROUND: Boys Markets AND Inland Steel

The Supreme Court in its historic decision, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerk's Union, Local 770,5 ruled that federal courts did have jurisdiction to
* Associate, Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz; former Trial Attorney,
NLRB, 1967-1971; member of the Illinois and Hawaii Bars; J.D., University of Chicago.
1. 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974).
2. 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1975).
3. 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975) [89 LRRM 2885]. [Where appropriate, the
BNA LABOR RELATiONS REPORTER MANUAL citations are provided for the convenience
of the practitioner].
4. 522 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1975).
5. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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issue injunctions against work stoppages over disputes which the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement had contractually agreed to arbitrate. Prior
to Boys Markets, federal courts relying on the anti-injunction provisions of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act6 had declined to enjoin employee strikes no
matter what the underlying collective bargaining agreement provided. The
Supreme Court in Boys Markets emphasized that its holding was "a narrow
one" and that not every strike was enjoinable. Nonetheless, in the subsequently decided Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 7 the Court expanded the literal
holding of Boys Markets and ruled that federal courts did have jurisdiction
to enjoin employee strikes over safety issues pending arbitration of whether
any express or implied "exception" to the no-strike clause permitted the
employees to strike over safety disputes.
With these two Supreme Court decisions as background, the Seventh
8
Circuit Court of Appeals in Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW
confronted for the first time the question of whether employees could be
enjoined from refusing to cross a stranger picket line (and thereby engaging
in their own strike) pending arbitration. The employees at one of Inland's
coal mines had refused to continue to work when the entrance of the mine
was picketed by employees from a different Local of the United Mine
Workers who worked for a different company at a mine in a different city.
The court, Judge Fairchild dissenting, ruled that the Boys Markets and
Gateway decisions of the Supreme Court authorized the issuance of an
injunction prohibiting concerted employee refusals to cross a stranger picket
line, pending arbibration to determine if the employees had that right under
the collective bargaining agreement then in effect. The underlying collective
bargaining agreement in Inland, the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, had been construed by the Supreme Court in Gateway as containing
an "implied" no-strike obligation. The arbitration clause was described by
the Seventh Circuit as being "exceptionally broad", since in addition to covering differences as to the meaning and application of the provisions of the
agreement, it covered "differences about matters not specifically mentioned
in this agreement" and "any local trouble of any kind (arising) at the mine".
In determining that the parties had a legally enforceable duty to
arbitrate, the Seventh Circuit found that an employee work stoppage over a
stranger picket line was "certainly local trouble at the mine", as that term
was used in the contract. Since the parties had agreed to resolve local
trouble disputes by the arbitration process, the court ordered the employees
back to work pending arbitration. The court also cited the "strong public
policy in favor of arbitration" articulated in the Steelworkers Trilogy9 cases.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
7. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).

8. 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1975).
9. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960),
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The court noted that "while the arbitrability of the issues involved here may
not be free from doubt, the Trilogy has instructed that all such doubts be
resolved in favor of arbitration." The Seventh Circuit declined to interpret
the contract terms or to decide the right of the parties in favor of "resolution
of these disputes by a skilled labor arbitrator with his unique knowledge of
the common law of the shop."
A fair reading of Inland would lead the observer to conclude that a
federal district court has jurisdiction to enjoin sympathy strikes by employees
in deference to stranger pickets, where the language of the arbitration and
no-strike provisions of the applicable collective bargaining agreement are
sufficiently broad to encompass the dispute. The Inland decision itself contains no language limiting the court's holding to the facts of the
particular case, nor any other indication that its holding should not be
applied to other sympathy strike situations.
Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB' 0
The court's decision in Inland did not foretell its later decisions in Gary
Hobart and Hyster Co. v. Independent Towing and Lifting Machine Association." The issue in Gary Hobart did not concern the propriety of a Boys
Markets injunction, but rather the enforcement of an NLRB order reinstating some thirty-three female clerical employees who had been discharged for
refusing to cross a picket line established by a separate group of production
and maintenance employees at the company's facility. The court agreed
with the NLRB that the employees, in respecting the picket line, had been
engaged in "protected concerted activity" and thus could not be discharged
for that activity without violating the terms of the National Labor Relations
Act 2 unless the contract clearly prohibited such conduct by the employees.' 3 The question of the arbitrability of the dispute was not before the

United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960).

10. 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1975).
11. 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975) [89 LRRM 28851.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970).
13. The no-strike clause in Gary Hobart reads:
[The parties agree that] there shall be no lockouts by the Company and

there shall be no strike, stoppages of work or any other form of interference

with any of the production or other operations of the Company -by the Union

or its members, and any and all disputes and controversies arising under or in
connection with the terms or provisions hereof shall be subject to the grievance
procedure . . . [followed by a three-step grievance procedure resulting in

binding arbitration under the third step].

The Union agrees that there shall be no strikes, slowdowns or other interruption of work by any of its members during the term of this agreement, and
the Company agrees that there shall be no lockout during the term of this
agreement, and both parties agree that any disputes or differences shall be
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court in Gary Hobart. Indeed, the employer in Gary Hobart had refused to
submit to arbitration the propriety of the employees' action under the terms
of the applicable collective bargaining agreement. Further, there was no
Boys Markets injunction issue involved in Gary Hobart. Nonetheless, the
court, speaking through Judge Sprecher, took the occasion to comment on
the Inland decision, which established a federal district court's jurisdiction to
enjoin a sympathy strike by employees pending arbitration. The court
stated that Inland was distinguishable for two reasons. First, the language
of the arbitration provision in the Gary Hobart collective bargaining agreement was limited to "disputes and controversies arising under or in connection with the terms and provisions hereof" and did not refer, as in Inland, to
"differences about matters not specifically mentioned" and "any local trouble
of any kind." Second, the court held that since the no-strike clause in Gary
Hobart did not specifically waive the employees' right to engage in sympathy
strikes, a sympathy strike was "unaffected" by the no-strike commitment.
The court ruled that in the absence of a specific waiver of the sympathy
strike right in the no-strike clause, the arbitration provision of the agreement
was not broad enough to permit or -require arbitration of whether the
employees could respect a stranger picket line, and thus, no Boys Markets
injunction could be issued.
14

ilyster Co. v. Independent Towing and Lifting Machine Association

In Hyster, the court was faced with a factual and legal situation much
closer to the Inland case. In Hyster, the "strangers" doing the picketing at
the company's 'Peoria plant were Hyster employees from a plant in a
different city, represented by a different union. When the company's Peoria
employees refused to cross the "stranger" picket line, Hyster sought and was
granted a Boys Markets injunction which required the employees to return to
work pending arbitration of whether their activity violated the no-strike
commitment in the agreement.
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, and directed that the
injunction be vacated and the complaint dismissed. The court stated that it
would not follow Inland on the grounds that the arbitration clause in the
Hyster agreement was not as broad as in the Inland agreement. The clause
itself mandated arbitration of "all differences, disputes or controversies
which arise between the Union, the Company, or any employee covered by
this Agreement and the Company." The court acknowledged that this
language was somewhat broader than the comparable provision in Gary
Hobart, but pointed out that no reference was made to "differences about

taken up under the Grievance and Arbitration procedures of this agreement.
511 F.2d 284, 287-88 (7th Cir. 1975) (citations omitted).
14. 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975) [89 LRRM 2885].
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matters not specifically mentioned in this agreement" or "any local trouble of
any kind", as in the Inland agreement. Further, the sympathy strike dispute
was not arbitrable in the absence of "clear and unmistakeable" language in
the no-strike clause prohibiting sympathy strikes. 1 5
The court conceded that in Inland the contract did not contain an
express no-strike clause, much less a specific waiver of the employees' right
to respect stranger picketing. The court concluded, however, that a work
stoppage by the employees over stranger picketing was not "over a grievance" which the parties had contractually agreed to arbitrate, but rather
"itself precipitated the dispute." The court held that a Boys Markets
injunction could not properly be issued under these circumstances.
The effect of Gary Hobart and Hyster is to confine Inland to sympathy
strikes arising under the unique arbitration language of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement. Although the court has expressly declined to
overrule Inland, it is evident that in the absence of an arbitration clause
which very closely tracks the language of the grievance-arbitration procedure
in the United Mine Workers Agreement, and quite possibly a specific
contractual waiver of the right to engage in a sympathy strike, a Boys
Markets injunction is not appropriate.
Western PublishingCo., Inc. v. Local 254, GraphicArts Union'6

The most recent Seventh Circuit opinion on the subject of enjoining
employee strikes in violation of contractual no-strike obligations is the
Western Publishing decision issued September 4, 1975. The issue in
Western Publishing was whether a Boys Markets injunction could be issued

where employees had concertedly refused to work on a job assignment,
which the union asserted constituted struck work. The underlying collective
bargaining agreement contained a broad commitment not to engage in any
"strikes, stoppages, slowdowns or general concerted action to interfere with
the quality and quantity of production required by the Company and its
customers during the term of this contract, except as otherwise provided
under this contract". Another provision of the contract provided that the
company would not require its employees to handle any struck work, that is,
work that but for a strike at some other plant, would not ordinarily have
been done by the company. When Western employees refused to perform a
particular job, asserting that it constituted struck work from another plant,
the company sought to require the employees to do the work, pending
15. The no-strike provision in Hyster reads:
The Union will not authorize, sanction, condone, promote or instigate any
strike, work stoppage, sitdown, slow down, picketing or curtailment of work or
interference with the efficient operation of the Company's plant or premises
during the term of this Agreement.
519 F.2d 89, 91 (7th Cir. 1975) [89 LRRM at 2887].
16. 522 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1975).
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arbitration of whether or not the work was, in fact, struck work within the
meaning of the agreement.
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the employer and authorized the
district court to issue an injunction compelling the employees to perform the
work pending arbitration. The precise issue to be arbitrated was whether
the contractual exception to the no-strike clause, relating to struck work, had
been triggered by the particular work assignment in question. The court
summarily distinguished its Gary Hobart and Hyster decisions with a
reference to Inland and the statement that an arbitrator should decide
whether the exception to the no-strike clause permitted the sympathy
17
strike.
The court in Western Publishing did not refer to the fact that the refusal
to work was not "over" a separate grievance which the parties had contractually bound themselves to arbitrate, but itself precipitated the dispute.
Nonetheless, the court determined that the district court did have jurisdiction
to order the employees to cease refusing to perform the work, pending the
arbitrator's ruling on whether the struck work exception to the no-strike
clause applied.
The union in Western argued vehemently that a judicial order compelling employees to perform the work while the parties arbitrated whether
or not it was struck work would effectively eliminate its contract right to
refuse to perform struck work, since the work would very likely be completed well before any arbitrable decision could be rendered. The union
asserted that if it was wrong and the work was determined not to be
"struck work" the company could sue for damages. The Seventh Circuit
was not persuaded. The court ruled that the union had breached the broad
no-strike commitment in the agreement and that an injunction could issue
requiring the employees to perform the work pending an arbitrable determination of whether the struck work exception applied.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT TERMS BY THE COURT

A major difficulty in reconciling the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Inland
with the Gary Hobart and Hyster decisions is understanding how the court
determined, as a matter of law, that the no-strike clauses and grievancearbitration procedures in Gary Hobart and Hyster did not contain a commitment to arbitrate sympathy strike disputes. In Hyster and Gary Hobart, the
court itself interpreted the no-strike clauses of the contracts and ruled that
they did not affect the employees' right to engage in a sympathy strike, and
that, therefore, there was nothing to arbitrate. Such contract interpretation
is, of course, the classic role of the arbitrator. In Inland, the court appeared
to recognize this, and observed that questions of arbitrability are better left
to the arbitrator, particularly in view of the Steelworkers Trilogy presump17. 522 F.2d 530, 532 n.6 (7th Cir. 1975).
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tion language. It left to the arbitrator the determination of whether the
contract's no-strike clause permitted the conduct complained of and whether
the dispute was encompassed by the grievance-arbitration machinery.
To the contrary, in Hyster and Gary Hobart the court concluded as a
matter of law that the "breadth" of the arbitration language could not cover
sympathy strikes by employees. The court did not indicate its reasons for
concluding that the arbitrator should not decide whether the arbitration
clause permitted the sympathy strike issue to be resolved in that forum or
whether the no-strike clause was intended to prohibit sympathy strikes.
The language of the arbitration and no-strike clauses involved in Hyster
and Gary Hobart is typical of collective bargaining agreements, and is
capable of being construed to apply to sympathy strikes given collective
bargaining history and consideration of the intent of the parties. In the
writer's opinion, there are no substantive reasons why an arbitrator could not
determine whether the parties, in negotiating the particular contract language
involved, intended to prohibit sympathy strikes and intended to have such
disputes resolved by the grievance procedure.
THE "OVER A GRIEVANCE" ISSUE
A basic reason for the court's refusal to follow Inland in the Hyster case
was its interpretation of the Boys Markets decision as requiring that the work
stoppage itself be "over a grievance" unrelated to the actual sympathy strike
in order to be enjoinable. This judicial search for a clearly arbitrable
grievance, separate and apart from the work stoppage itself, is fundamental
to the court's decision in Hyster that no injunction was permissible. In
Inland, the court held that even though no separate arbitrable grievance
exists, any work stoppage during the life of an agreement in which the union
had given a broad commitment not to strike presents, at the very least, "local
trouble" and an arbitrable issue as to whether the conduct breached the nostrike term of the agreement.
Assuming that the grievance procedure itself permits the employer to
file and pursue its claim that the employees had breached the no-strike term
of the agreement by refusing to work, then the conclusion would seem to
logically follow that a "grievance" or "dispute" then existed which an
arbitrator, rather than the court, could, and presumably should, decide.
Under normal presumptions, an arbitrator, rather than a federal district
court, is the preferable party to decide, based on the history of negotiations
and the "common law of the shop," whether a particular sympathy strike is
prohibited by contractual commitments between an employer and a union.
The Seventh Circuit in Western Publishing ignored this issue altogether
and ruled that an arbitrable issue was present based solely on the struck
work exception to the no-strike clause. The failure of the court in Western
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Publishing to discuss the implications of the fact that the strike was not over
a separate arbitrable grievance, but itself generated the dispute, is difficult to
understand since Hyster itself is firmly grounded on that consideration.
The scope of the federal district court's authority to issue Boys Markets
injunctions continues to produce fundamental disagreements within the
circuits at the district court and appellate levels. Circuit courts which strictly
construe Boys Markets to apply only in those cases in which a clearly
identifiable separate arbitrable grievance exists include the Second, Fifth,
Sixth and perhaps the Seventh.
In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,'8 the Second Circuit
refused to enjoin a sympathy strike by employees caused by stranger
picketing, notwithstanding a broad no-strike clause and a mandatory arbitration procedure, because there was no "other" dispute causing the strike
which could be arbitrated. 19 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Anstar Corp. v.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters20 was concerned with expansion of the Boys
Markets holding where no clearly arbitrable dispute caused the strike. The
court refused to approve a Boys Markets injunction over a spontaneous
sympathy strike because, as the court observed, if it did so in that case, it
would be "difficult to conceive of any strike which could not be so
21
enjoined".
The Sixth Circuit22 and the Fourth Circuit2 8 have similarly limited
views of the Boys Markets decision. Several district courts have also
concluded that Boys Markets injunctions should not issue in the absence of
the strike being "over" a clearly arbitrable dispute. 24 Contrariwise, there is
substantial judicial support in decisions of the Third, Fourth and 'Eighth Circuits for the more flexible view that Boys Markets injunctions pending arbitration are appropriate in sympathy strike situations whenever an issue exists
18. 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975).
19. After this article was prepared, the Supreme Court, on October 20, 1975,
granted certiorari in Buffalo Forge, 96 S. Ct. 214 (No. 75-339). In that decision,
the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of a Boys Markets injunction for essentially the
same reasons as expressed by the Seventh Circuit in its Gary Hobart and Hyster decisions. A petition for certiorari in the Gary Hobart case was denied by the Supreme
Court on November 3, 1975, 96 S. Ct. 269. A petition for certiorari in the Hyster
case (sub nom. Hyster Co. v. Employees Association of Kewanee) was filed on October
6, 1975, 44 U.S.L.W. 3230 (No. 75-524).
20. 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972).
21. Id. at 1373.
22. See, e.g., Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union, 520
F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975).
23. See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974).
24. See, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Teamsters Local 949, 74 CCH Lab. Cas.
10,273
(S.D. Tex. 1974) [86 LRRM 3012]; General Cable Corp. v. IBEW, Local 1644, 331
F. Supp. 478 (D. Md. 1971); Simplex Wire and Cable Co. v. Local 2208, IBEW, 314
F. Supp. 885 (D.N.H. 1970); Stokely-Van Camp v. Thacker, 394 F. Supp. 715 (W.D.
Wash. 1975) [89 LRRM 2145]; 12th and L Limited v. Operating Engineers, 396 F.
Supp. 1174 (D.D.C. 1975) [88 LRRM 2575].
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requiring interpretation of the language of, or an exception to, the no-strike
clause.

In Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW,2 5 the Fourth Circuit
concluded that a refusal by employees to cross a stranger picket line was in
violation of the broad no-strike provision (the contract contained no exception or waiver dealing with respecting picket lines) and was itself an
arbitrable dispute making a Boys Markets injunction appropriate. The
Fourth Circuit followed the Monongahela rationale in Wilmington Shipping
v. Longshoremen,26 which involved a sympathy strike and a contract
exception to the no-strike clause in which the employer recognized "the -right
27
of employees not to cross a bona fide picket line".
The Third Circuit in NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs,
Local 92628 ruled that a Boys Markets injunction was appropriate where the
only dispute to be arbitrated was whether the striking employees, pursuant to
an exception to the no-strike clause, were respecting a "primary" picket line
established by another union. The Third Circuit followed the Seventh
Circuit's Inland decision in another case involving stranger picketing within
the coal industry, Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW, 29 and approved the
issuance of a Boys Markets injunction even though the only issue to be
arbitrated was whether the employees had breached the implied no-strike
commitment in the contract. Interestingly, the court noted that if the
employer had discharged all of the sympathy strikers a clear contractual
grievance would have arisen which would have required arbitration. Other
district courts have approved Boys Markets injunctions where the issue is the
propriety of the sympathy strike in view of the no-strike provision in a
collective bargaining agreement3 0
THE INCONSISTENCIES RESULTING FROM THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT OPINIONS

If the rationale of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Western Publishing
is extended to sympathy strike situations an interesting anomaly results. If
the underlying contract's no-strike clause contains an exception expressly
permitting employees to respect a lawful or primary stranger picket line and
to engage in sympathy strikes, then an arbitrable issue would exist as to
25. 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973).
26. 74 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 10,129 (4th Cir.) [86 LRRM 2846], cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1022 (1974).
27. See also Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974); Pilot
Freight Carriers v. Teamsters Union, 497 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 869 (1974).

28. 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 625 (1975).

29. 507 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1975).
30. See Barnard College v. Transport Workers Union, 372 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. UMW, 375 F. Supp. 980 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
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whether the exception of the no-strike clause had been triggered. Under
Western Publishing, a district court would have a proper basis for a Boys
Markets injunction pending arbitration of whether the stranger picket was
lawful or primary and thus whether the employees had the right to engage in
the sympathy strike. 31 Just this result was reached in two recent Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals cases, Valmac Industries, Inc. v. Food Handlers,
Local 42532 and Associated General Contractors v. Construction and General Laborers.3 3

'In both decisions, the Eighth Circuit approved the issuance of Boys
Markets injunctions against employee sympathy strikes, even though the
applicable collective bargaining agreement contained a provision affirmatively setting forth the right of the employees to respect a lawful picket line.
In the Eighth Circuit's view, the question of whether work stoppages were
justified by the contractual provisions authorizing employees to respect a
lawful picket line presented issues of contract interpretation that were for an
arbitrator to decide. As for the argument that the court should not enjoin a
work stoppage in the absence of a clear waiver of that right (raised by the
union in Western Publishing), the court observed: "Injunctive relief, conditioned upon prompt arbitration of the dispute does not nullify a union's right
to establish or honor a picket line, it 'only suspends the exercise of the right
until its existence is established by an arbitrator's decision.' -34
The Seventh Circuit's opinions in Hyster, Gary Hobart and Western

Publishing present perplexing problems for labor-management negotiators in
negotiating no-strike clauses and arbitration procedures. Even though the
underlying collective bargaining agreement contains a specific provision
setting forth or restating the employees' right to engage in sympathy strikes
and to respect stranger picketing, or to refuse to perform struck work,
apparently a Boys Markets injunction would be permissible, since an arbitrable question would always exist as to whether the contract provision was
intended to cover the particular conduct in question. On the other hand, in
those collective bargaining agreements where the union has attempted to
obtain a specific contractual restatement of the employees' right to respect
picket lines, but has not been successful in its attempt, and the contract
instead contains only a straightforward no-strike clause with no "exceptions"
for sympathy strikes, a federal court lacks jurisdiction to issue a Boys
Markets injunction because such a dispute is not "over" a separate griev31. Cf. Wilmington Shipping v. Longshoremen, 74 CCH Lab. Cas.
10,129 (4th
Cir.) [86 LRRM 2846], cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974).
32. 519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S.
Oct. 31, 1975) (No. 75-647).
33. 519 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1974).
34. Valmac Industries, Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d 263, 268 (8th
Cir. 1975), citing NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffers, Local 926, 502 F.2d

321, 324 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 625 (1975).
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ance, and may not be enjoined because there is nothing for the arbitrator to
decide.
The distinctions relied upon by the Seventh Circuit in the cases
discussed have justified or denied Boys Markets injunctions on shifting
considerations and on technical interpretations of the "scope" of the contract
no-strike-arbitration clauses. The issuance or denial of an injunction based
on the considerations employed by the Seventh Circuit may or may not
reflect the intent of the parties in agreeing to particular contract provisions in
the no-strike area. The particular language of no-strike clauses and grievance arbitration procedures is often agreed to by negotiating parties with
little or no thought or discussion given to the increasing variety of potential
causes for work stoppages by employees (e.g., sympathy strikes, political
strikes, safety disputes, struck work assignments, consumer picketing, not to
mention the historical causes such as working conditions, employee discipline, complaints about supervisors). Further, contract language once
agreed to is often retained in subsequent agreements based on nothing more
than inertia, long after the parties have forgotten why it was negotiated in
the first place. 3 5 For the issuance of a Boys Markets injunction to turn on
whether or not the contract contains an express affirmance or waiver of the
right to engage in sympathy strikes may be nothing more than a reward of
historical accident or a lack of foresight by negotiating parties.
The apparent result of the Seventh Circuit's decisions is that employees
will be permitted to engage in sympathy strikes, notwithstanding a standard
no-strike commitment, so long as no exception to the no-strike clause is
involved. This result provides an incentive for the employer-negotiator, if
the union is unwilling to agree to an unequivocal waiver of the right to
engage in sympathy strikes, to propose or suggest that the no-strike clause in
the agreement specifically spell out the right of employees to engage in
sympathy strikes, political strikes and safety walkouts or to refuse to perform
struck work. If the union negotiator agrees to such an "exception" to the
no-strike clause, the employer may seek a Boys Markets injunction, pending
an arbitrator's construction of whether the exception to the no-strike clause
permits the work stoppage. The union negotiator who unwittingly agrees to
such specific provisions in the no-strike area will have a lot of explaining to
do to the membership as to why a federal court injunction can prohibit
employee work stoppages, notwithstanding the contract language.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's direction in Gateway that "an order to arbitrate
the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with
35. For example, the "any local trouble of any kind" provision in the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement has been in successive agreements for over 30 years,
well prior to the development of widespread employee sympathy strikes in that industry.
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positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor
of coverage .

. . ."

is paid only lip service in the Seventh Circuit's Hyster

and Gary Hobart decisions. In addition, the crucial question of whether a
separate arbitrable grievance must exist in order for a Boys Markets
injunction to lie has not been squarely faced up to by the court in the
decisions discussed.
The Seventh Circuit has chosen to rule on the propriety of Boys
Markets injunctions on a case by case basis based on finely drawn judicial
intepretations of the language of no strike and arbitration clauses, notwithstanding that the particular words involved were usually agreed to years previously, typically with little or no consideration given to the occurrence of
sympathy strikes. The contradictory results reached in the cases considered,
and the shifting explanations advanced by the court, make the task for management and labor negotiators in the sympathy strike area nearly impossible.
Until the Supreme Court resolves the split in authority over the proper interpretation to be given its Boys Markets decision, the status of injunctions over
sympathy strikes in the Seventh Circuit will remain, at best, problematical.

